

Part A

Read the text below and decide accordingly on whether statements numbers 01 to 15 are true (T) or false (F).

Congress History: Filibuster and Cloture

01 The term filibuster – derived from a Dutch word meaning “pirate” – became
02 popular in the 1850s, when it was applied to efforts to hold the Senate floor in order
03 to prevent a vote on a bill.
04 In the early years of Congress, representatives as well as senators could filibuster.
05 As the House of Representatives grew in numbers, however, revisions to the House
06 rules limited debate. In the smaller Senate, unlimited debate continued on the
07 grounds that any senator should have the right to speak as long as necessary on any
08 issue.
09 In 1841, when the Democratic minority hoped to block a bank bill promoted by
10 Kentucky Senator Henry Clay, he threatened to change Senate rules to allow the
11 majority to close debate. Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton rebuked Clay for
12 trying to stifle the Senate's right to unlimited debate.
13 Three quarters of a century later, in 1917, senators adopted a rule (Rule 22), at the
13 urging of President Woodrow Wilson, that allowed the Senate to end a debate with
15 a two-thirds majority vote, a device known as "cloture." The new Senate rule was
16 first put to the test in 1919, when the Senate invoked cloture to end a filibuster
17 against the Treaty of Versailles.
18 Even with the new cloture rule, filibusters remained an effective means to block
19 legislation, since a two-thirds vote is difficult to obtain. Over the next five decades,
20 the Senate occasionally tried to invoke cloture, but usually failed to gain the
21 necessary two-thirds vote. Filibusters were particularly useful to Southern senators
22 who sought to block civil rights legislation, including anti-lynching legislation,
23 until cloture was invoked after a 60 day filibuster against the Civil Right Act of
24 1964. In 1975, the Senate reduced the number of votes required for cloture from
25 two-thirds to three-fifths, or 60 of the current one hundred senators.
26 Many Americans are familiar with the filibuster conducted by Jimmy Stewart,
27 playing Senator Jefferson Smith in Frank Capra's film Mr. Smith Goes to
28 Washington, but there have been some famous filibusters in the real-life Senate as
29 well. During the 1930s, Senator Huey P. Long effectively used the filibuster against
30 bills that he thought favored the rich over the poor.
31 The Louisiana senator frustrated his colleagues while entertaining spectators with
32 his recitations of Shakespeare and his reading of recipes for "pot-likkers." Long
33 once held the Senate floor for 15 hours. The record for the longest individual
34 speech goes to South Carolina's J. Strom Thurmond who filibustered for 24 hours
35 and 18 minutes against the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

Adapted from: http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Clature.htm. Retrieved on 3rd April 2014.

Nr.	Statement	T	F
1.	O termo “flibusteiro”, derivado de uma palavra holandesa que significa “pirata”, tornou-se popular no século XVIII, quando iniciou-se seu uso para designar esforços para obstrução de votação no plenário do Senado dos Estados Unidos.		
2.	Nos primórdios do funcionamento do Congresso estadounidense, tanto deputados quanto senadores utilizavam-se de recursos de obstrução. No entanto, conforme o número de deputados foi aumentando, revisões do regimento interno da Casa dos Representantes acabaram por limitar os debates.		
3.	Sendo o Senado menor do que a Casa dos Representantes, debates sem limite de tempo continuavam a ocorrer, tendo em vista que qualquer Senador deveria ter o direito de utilizar-se da palavra o tanto que fosse necessário para discutir qualquer tipo de assunto.		
4.	Em meados do século XIX, quando a minoria democrata tencionava obstruir um projeto de lei do Senador Henry Clay, este ameaçou mudar o regimento interno do Senado para que a maioria pudesse encerrar o debate.		
5.	Em meados do século XIX, o Senador Thomas Benton endossou o comportamento do Senador Henry Clay de tentar mudar o regimento interno do Senado para que a maioria pudesse encerrar o debate.		
6.	O encerramento do debate, chamado de “cloture”, foi introduzido como mecanismo regimental no Senado, a pedido do então Presidente Woodrow Wilson, no início do século XX.		
7.	O mecanismo regimental de “cloture” foi invocado para testar as regras para a discussão dos termos do Tratado de Versalhes, em 1919.		
8.	Mesmo com o novo mecanismo regimental de “cloture”, manobras flibusteiras continuaram a ser um meio efetivo de obstruir a votação de projetos de lei, uma vez que uma maioria de dois terços é difícil de se obter.		
9.	Durante um período de cinquenta anos, o Senado tentou ocasionalmente utilizar-se do mecanismo regimental para encerramento de discussão, mas, geralmente, não conseguia obter os dois terços dos votos para valer-se do dito mecanismo.		
10.	A manobra regimental flibusteira foi bastante útil para senadores sulistas que buscavam obstruir legislação sobre direitos civis, referente à Lei dos Direitos Civis de 1964.		
11.	Em meados dos anos 1970s, o Senado reduziu a quantidade de votos para aprovação do encerramento da obstrução de dois terços para três quintos, ou seja 60% da atual composição do Senado.		
12.	Apesar de estarem familiarizados com o instituto da obstrução por meio de longos discursos, muitos norte-americanos conhecem tal manobra regimental pelo exemplo real da vida do Senador Jefferson Smith.		
13.	Nos anos 1930s, o Senador Huey conseguiu utilizar-se da manobra regimental flibusteira contra projetos de lei que ele acreditava favoreceriam os ricos em detrimento dos pobres.		

14.	Ao utilizar-se da manobra regimental flibusteira, o Senador Huey conseguia frustrar seus colegas com suas declamações de textos de famoso escritor inglês e sua leitura de receitas de ensopados.		
15.	O Senador Thurmond detém o recorde de obstrução, tendo em vista que discursou em Plenário por mais de 24 horas contra a Lei dos Direitos Civis de 1957.		

Part B

Read texts I to III and answer questions 1 to 15 that follow. Be as straightforward and strict to the original text as possible. Write your answers in Portuguese.

I - “Who follows whom? Elites and Masses. Most of the available literature on the interaction between mass public opinion and elites in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies can be categorized according to two broad concepts. In accordance with the pluralist theory of democracy, a “bottom-up” approach assumes that the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy-making process. In sum, leaders follow masses.

However, the bottom-up concept is difficult to reconcile with the following empirical counterevidence:

- In Western Europe, the U.S. and Japan, elites and masses show similar support for basic foreign policy goals and institutions, prevailing political, religious, and ideological cleavages structure within the elite as well as in the mass public opinion.
- There are many cases in which crucial foreign policy decisions have been taken in absence of mass public consensus, such as the West German decisions to rearm and join NATO in the early 1950s and to pursue an active policy towards its Eastern siblings in the late 1960s.

Therefore, a second approach representing the conventional wisdom in the literature suggests a “top-down” process, according to which popular consensus is a function of the elite consensus and elite cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion.

In such a case, it is assumed that the public is easily manipulated by political leaders, because of (1) the low salience of foreign and security policy issues as compared with economic policies; (2) the low degree of knowledge about the issues involved, and (3) the volatility of public opinion.

Again, empirical evidence suggests that these assumptions are questionable:

- While domestic problems usually outweigh foreign and security issues in public salience, data reveal that substantial minorities consider foreign affairs among the most important problems facing their respective countries.”

Adapted from Risse-Kappen, T. Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies. *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 479-512. Cambridge University Press. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010534>. Accessed: 11/02/2010 11h01

1. Segundo o autor, a interação entre opinião pública e elites no processo de elaboração da política externa em sociedades democráticas pode ser categorizada em dois conceitos amplos. Qual o primeiro deles? O que o autor diz a seu respeito?

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2. Segundo o autor, a interação entre opinião pública e elites no processo de elaboração da política externa em sociedades democráticas pode ser categorizada em dois conceitos amplos. Qual o segundo deles? O que o autor diz a seu respeito?

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3. O autor apresenta dois contrapontos ao primeiro conceito de interação entre opinião pública e elites no processo de elaboração da política externa. O que o autor diz sobre o primeiro deles?

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4. O autor apresenta dois contrapontos ao primeiro conceito de interação entre opinião pública e elites no processo de elaboração da política externa. O que o autor diz sobre o segundo deles?

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5. No segundo conceito de interação entre opinião pública e elites no processo de elaboração da política externa, o autor apresenta três características que explicam por que o público é manipulado pelas elites. Quais são elas?

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6. Por que a evidência empírica sugere que essas três características são questionáveis?

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II – “Fenno’s research still provides one of the best accounts of how responsiveness works: members represent the district in the manner they perceive is most likely to get them reelected (Fenno 1978). And district participation shapes these perceptions. To better understand what members of Congress see, we interviewed the Chiefs of Staff in 10 high-participation districts. Representatives represent the districts they see, and citizen participation is a clearly

visible element. They see it in the size of the groups that attend public meetings, they see it in the volume of mail they receive, and they see it on election day. We argue that elected officials use their district's underlying pattern of participation to estimate the citizen's capacity for surveillance and sanction. While members of Congress are generally accustomed to public scrutiny of their behavior, they rely on cues that allow them to judge how closely they are being watched. High levels of district participation point to an enhanced constituency capacity. High-participation districts do not only vote at high rates, they send an enormous amount of mail, they flock to events with the congressional district staff, and they light up the phone lines when they are concerned.

To elaborate, districts with high voter turnout consistently receive correspondingly high volumes of mail creating a compelling one-two punch of surveillance in mail and sanction in voting. A comparison of the high- and low-turnout districts confirms this. At the upper end of district turnout, congressional offices receive, process, and respond to twice the amount of citizen mail as the congressional offices at the lower end of district turnout. In more participatory districts, the volume of incoming constituency mail exceeds 50,000 pieces a year. Judging by the amount of money spent by congressional offices on postage in response to individual letters, the 15 congressional districts with the highest voter turnout spent an average of just over \$10,000 in 2004, whereas the 15 congressional districts with the fewest voters spent an average of under \$5,000 that same year.

Adapted from Martin, P. S., Claibourn, M. P. Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters. *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*, XXXVIII, 1, February 2013. The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa, pp 59-81.

7. O que a pesquisa de Fenno (1978) ainda oferece? Como isso funciona?

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8. Os parlamentares percebem a participação popular de três maneiras. Quais são elas?

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9. A que estão membros do Congresso geralmente acostumados? Em que baseiam seu julgamento? O que indicam altos níveis de participação?

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10. Como se comportam distritos de alta participação em relação à correspondência?

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11. O que a comparação entre distritos de alto e baixo comparecimento em eleições confirma?

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12. O que se pode afirmar levando em conta a quantia de dinheiro gasto, em 2004, em postagem para responder cartas individuais?

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III. The regional reform has significantly affected grassroots politics in Italy. As a result of this institutional change, national political leaders have had their behavior affected in five different ways. Nowadays, they pursue different career paths, espouse different ideals, address social ills in different terms, struggle with different rivals and collaborate with different partners.

On the other hand, citizens and community leaders depend on different agencies for government action. Often they receive improved services, though certainly not always, and when they don't, they address their complaints to different officials. Important things have changed because of the regional reform.

All in all, it freed the more advanced regions from the stultifying grasp of Rome, while allowing the problems of the more backward regions to fester.

Adapted from Putnam, R. Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 1993. pp 60-61

13. Como a mudança institucional afetou os comportamentos dos líderes políticos nacionais?

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14. Por outro lado, como cidadãos e líderes comunitários foram afetados?

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15. No geral, como a reforma afetou as regiões mais avançadas? O que aconteceu com as menos avançadas?

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